System Integrator needs to execute a common cause failure analysis to consider possible dependent/common cause failures on the sub-elements of the TMS320F28003x MCU, including pin level connections.

1. Consider a relevant list of dependent failure initiators, such as the lists found in ISO 26262-11:2018. Analysis of dependent failures should include common cause failures among functional redundant parts and also between functions and the respective safety mechanisms.
2. Verify that the dependent failure analysis considers the impact of the software tasks running on the TMS320F28003x MCU, including hardware and software interactions.
3. Verify that the dependent failure analysis considers the impact of the pin or ball level interactions on the TMS320F28003x MCU package, including aspects related to the selected I/O multiplexing.

The following should be considered for addressing the common cause failures when using the TMS320F28003x MCU:

1. Redundant functions and safety mechanism can be impacted by common power failure. A common cause failure on power source can be detected by PWR1-External Voltage Supervisor, PWR2-External Watchdog.
2. In general, a clock source which is common to redundant functions should be monitored and any failures on the same can be detected by safety mechanisms such as CLK1-Missing Clock Detect (MCD), CLK2-Clock Integrity Check Using CPU Timer, CLK5-External Clock Monitoring via XCLKOUT and CLK8-Periodic Software Read Back of Static Configuration Registers. Specifically, to avoid common clock failure affecting Internal Watchdog (WD) and CPU, it is recommended to use either INTOSC2 or X1/X2 as clock source to PLL.
3. Failure of common reset signal to redundant functions can be detected by RST1-External Monitoring of Warm Reset (XRSn), RST2-Reset Cause Information.
4. Common cause failure on Interconnect logic could impact both redundant functions and also functional safety mechanism in same way. In addition to other safety mechanisms, INC1-Software Test of Function Including Error Tests can be implemented to detect faults on interconnect logic.
5. Common cause failure could impact two functions used in a redundant way. In case the of communication peripherals, module specific Information Redundancy Techniques Including End-to-End Safing can be implemented to detect common cause failures, for example, CAN2-Information Redundancy Techniques Including End-to-End Safing, SPI2-Information Redundancy Techniques Including End-to-End Safing, SCI3-Information Redundancy Techniques Including End-to-End Safing, I2C3-Information Redundancy Techniques Including End-to-End Safing.
6. Use different voltage references and SOC trigger sources for ADC (see Section 6.5.8).
7. Use ePWM modules from different sync groups for implementing Hardware Redundancy.
8. Use nonadjacent GPIO pins from different groups when implementing Hardware Redundancy for GPIO pins.