SLAA600E June   2013  – January 2024

 

  1.   1
  2.   Abstract
  3.   Trademarks
  4. 1Introduction
    1. 1.1 Glossary
    2. 1.2 Conventions
  5. 2Implementation
    1. 2.1 Main
    2. 2.2 Application Manager
      1. 2.2.1 Boot and Application Detection
        1. 2.2.1.1 Force Bootloader Mode
        2. 2.2.1.2 Application Validation
        3. 2.2.1.3 Jump to Application
      2. 2.2.2 Vector Redirection
      3. 2.2.3 Interrupt Vectors in Flash Devices
      4. 2.2.4 Dual Image Support
        1. 2.2.4.1 Jumping to Application in Dual Image Mode
    3. 2.3 Memory Interface (MI)
      1. 2.3.1 Dual Image Support
    4. 2.4 Communication Interface (CI)
      1. 2.4.1 Physical-DataLink (PHY-DL)
        1. 2.4.1.1 I2C
          1. 2.4.1.1.1 Time-out Detection
        2. 2.4.1.2 UART
        3. 2.4.1.3 SPI
        4. 2.4.1.4 CC110x
        5. 2.4.1.5 Comm Sharing
      2. 2.4.2 NWK-APP
        1. 2.4.2.1 BSL-Based Protocol
          1. 2.4.2.1.1 Security
          2. 2.4.2.1.2 BSL-Based Protocol using CC110x
          3. 2.4.2.1.3 Examples Using I2C
          4. 2.4.2.1.4 Examples Using UART or CC110x
  6. 3Customization of MSPBoot
    1. 3.1 Predefined Customizations
  7. 4Building MSPBoot
    1. 4.1 Starting a New Project
      1. 4.1.1 Creating a New MSPBoot Project
        1. 4.1.1.1 MSPBootProjectCreator.pl
        2. 4.1.1.2 Importing Project Spec File in CCS
        3. 4.1.1.3 Modifying Generated Source Code
          1. 4.1.1.3.1 Modifying MSPBoot Main.c
          2. 4.1.1.3.2 Modifying TI_MSPBoot_Config.h
          3. 4.1.1.3.3 Modifying TI_MSPBoot_CI_PHYDL_xxxx_xxx.c
          4. 4.1.1.3.4 Modifying TI_MSPBoot_AppMgr.c
          5. 4.1.1.3.5 Modifying Application Main.c
          6. 4.1.1.3.6 Modifying TI_MSPBoot_Mgr_Vectors_xxxx.c
      2. 4.1.2 Loading Application Code With MSPBoot
        1. 4.1.2.1 Convert Application Output Images
    2. 4.2 Examples
      1. 4.2.1 LaunchPad Development Kit Hardware
      2. 4.2.2 CC110x Hardware
      3. 4.2.3 Building the Target Project
      4. 4.2.4 Building the Host Project
      5. 4.2.5 Running the Examples
  8. 5References
  9. 6Revision History
2.4.2.1.1 Security

The contents of each packet are validated with a 16-bit CRC that provides additional robustness to the bootloader. The host can check the result of each command and retry if the previous command was unsuccessful.

The ERASE_SEGMENT and RX_DATA_BLOCK commands can erase and write any area within the 16-bit memory map, thus potentially corrupting the bootloader. To avoid this possibility, TI recommends including the CONFIG_MI_MEMORY_RANGE_CHECK MI definition to validate the address before a program or erase operation. The application areas can be corrupted if the process is interrupted, so TI recommends using one of the application validation methods described in Section 2.2.1.2 or use the dual-image approach.