SLLA535 December   2022 TLIN1431-Q1

 

  1. 1Introduction
    1.     Trademarks
  2. 2TLIN1431x-Q1 Hardware Component Functional Safety Capability
  3. 3Development Process for Management of Systematic Faults
    1. 3.1 TI New-Product Development Process
    2. 3.2 TI Functional Safety Development Process
  4. 4TLIN1431x-Q1 Component Overview
    1. 4.1 Targeted Applications
    2. 4.2 Hardware Component Functional Safety Concept
    3. 4.3 Functional Safety Constraints and Assumptions
  5. 5Description of Hardware Component Parts
    1. 5.1 LIN Transceiver
    2. 5.2 Digital Core
    3. 5.3 Power Control IP
    4. 5.4 Digital Input/Output Pins and High-side Switch
  6. 6TLIN1431x-Q1 Management of Random Faults
    1. 6.1 Fault Reporting
    2. 6.2 Functional Safety Mechanism Categories
    3. 6.3 Description of Functional Safety Mechanisms
      1. 6.3.1 LIN Bus and Communication
        1. 6.3.1.1 SM-1: LIN TXD Pin Dominant State Timeout
        2. 6.3.1.2 SM-2: LIN Bus Stuck Dominant System Fault: False Wake Up Lockout
        3. 6.3.1.3 SM-3: LIN Bus Short Circuit Limiter
        4. 6.3.1.4 SM-20: LIN Internal pull-up to VSUP
        5. 6.3.1.5 SM-22: LIN Protocol
      2. 6.3.2 Voltage Rail Monitoring
        1. 6.3.2.1 SM-4: VCC and Transceiver Thermal Shutdown
        2. 6.3.2.2 SM-5: VCC Under-voltage
        3. 6.3.2.3 SM-6: VCC Over-voltage
        4. 6.3.2.4 SM-7: VCC Short to Ground
        5. 6.3.2.5 SM-8: VSUP Under-voltage
      3. 6.3.3 Processor Communication
        1. 6.3.3.1 SM-9 and SM-10: Watchdog
          1. 6.3.3.1.1 SM-9: Standby Mode Long Window Timeout Watchdog
          2. 6.3.3.1.2 SM-10: Normal Mode Watchdog
        2. 6.3.3.2 SM-11: SPI CRC
        3. 6.3.3.3 SM-12: SPI Communication Error; SPIERR
        4. 6.3.3.4 SM-13: Scratchpad Write/Read Register
        5. 6.3.3.5 SM-14: Sleep Wake Error Timer; tINACT_FS
      4. 6.3.4 Digital Input/Output Pins and High-side Switch
        1. 6.3.4.1 SM-15: CLK internal pull-up to VINT
        2. 6.3.4.2 SM-16: SDI internal pull-up to VINT
        3. 6.3.4.3 SM-17: nCS Internal pull-up to VINT
        4. 6.3.4.4 SM-18: DIV_ON Internal pull-down to GND
        5. 6.3.4.5 SM-19: TXD Internal pull-up to VINT
        6. 6.3.4.6 SM-21: nRST Internal pull-up to VINT
        7. 6.3.4.7 SM-23: HSS Over Current Detect
        8. 6.3.4.8 SM-24: HSS Open Load Detect
          1.        A Summary of Recommended Functional Safety Mechanism Usage
            1.         B Distributed Developments
              1.          B.1 How the Functional Safety Lifecycle Applies to TI Functional Safety Products
              2.          B.2 Activities Performed by Texas Instruments
              3.          B.3 Information Provided
                1.           C Revision History

Activities Performed by Texas Instruments

The TI functional safety products are hardware components developed as functional Safety Elements out of Context. As such, TI's functional safety activities focus on those related to management of functional safety around hardware component development. System level architecture, design, and functional safety analysis are not within the scope of TI activities and are the responsibility of the customer. Some techniques for integrating the SEooC safety analysis of this hardware component into the system level can be found in ISO 26262-11.

Table 8-1 Activities Performed by Texas Instruments versus Performed by the customer
Functional Safety Lifecycle Activity(1)TI ExecutionCustomer Execution
Management of functional safetyYesYes
Definition of end equipment and itemNoYes
Hazard analysis and risk assessment (of end equipment/item)NoYes
Creation of end equipment functional safety conceptNo. Assumptions made for internal development. Yes
Allocation of end equipment requirements to sub-systems, hardware components, and software componentsNo. Assumptions made for internal development. Yes
Definition of hardware component safety requirementsYesNo
Hardware component architecture and design executionYesNo
Hardware component functional safety analysisYesNo
Hardware component verification and validation (V&V)V&V executed to support internal development. Yes
Integration of hardware component into end equipmentNoYes
Verification of IC performance in end equipmentNoYes
Selection of safety mechanisms to be applied to ICNoYes
End equipment level verification and validationNoYes
End equipment level functional safety analysisNoYes
End equipment level functional safety assessmentNoYes
End equipment release to productionNoYes
Management of functional safety issues in productionSupport provided as neededYes
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